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Abstract
This paper introduces the ‘extended linear-homothetic’ preferences to model
consumer choice. Specifically, we extend Datta and Dixon’s (2000) ‘standard
linear-homothetic’ preferences by adding an additional term to the unit cost
function. This term captures the relative importance of price interactions within
sectors on the unit cost of utility. In an economy composed of a large number of
sectors (K) with a suﬃciently large number of firms (n) in each, the ‘extended
linear-homothetic’ preferences yield (perceived) linear demands in own strat-
egy and competitors’ strategies - where goods are characterized as substitutes.
Thus, the linearity and homotheticity properties of the preferences open the
possibility to develop a tractable model of oligopoly in general equilibrium. An
additional novelty introduced by the ‘extended linear-homothetic’ preferences is
the presence of a sectoral-specific price index in product demand. For n small,
this implies that firms internalize the sectoral price eﬀects of their individual
pricing strategies. The latter, we argue, may provide us with a link between
nonatomistic price and wage setters and the monetary authority.
Keywords: Duality; Homotheticity; Oligopolistic Competition; General Equi-
librium.
JEL classification: D11; D21; D43; L1.
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1. Introduction
We present an extended version of the linear-homothetic (LH) preferences
developed by Datta and Dixon (2000). In an economy composed of a large
number of sectors (K) with a suﬃciently large number of firms (n) in each, the
extended LH preferences result in a direct product demand function for each
good that is linear in own price and competitors’ prices within the oligopolistic
sector - where goods are characterized as substitutes. Furthermore, direct prod-
uct demands depend inversely upon a sectoral-specific price index, indicating
that consumers’ demand for each good is responsive to a sectoral price indicator.
The extended LH preferences produce (perceived) linear demand systems
that exhibit similar properties to the ones we find in, for example, Singh and
Vives (1984). A particular advantage of using the extended LH preferences
to model consumer choice is that they can be easily integrated into a general
equilibrium model. This would allow us both, to explore the general equilib-
rium outcomes delivered by (a)symmetric diﬀerentiated oligopolies (competing
strategically in either prices or quantities), and to formalize the macroeconomic
outcomes of asymmetric right-to-manage wage bargaining under alternative de-
grees of centralization. Furthermore, we argue that, under certain conditions,
the product demand functions derived from the extended LH preferences may
provide us with a link between nonatomistic price and wage setters and the
monetary authority.
We follow Datta and Dixon (2000) in adopting the dual approach, and we
extend their unit cost function by adding an additional term which captures
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the relative importance of price interactions within sectors on the unit cost of
utility. Hence, the unit cost of utility has two parameters, γ and δ, which deter-
mine (direct) product demand elasticity at symmetric equilibrium, that is when
all individual prices are identical due to symmetry across sectors. Intuitively,
given γ, parameter δ captures the intensity of competition in the economy:
from the monopolistically competitive economy (δ = 0) to the oligopolistically
competitive one (δ > 0).
As an application of the extended LH preferences to partial equilibrium
analysis, we derive inverse demand functions and we compare equilibrium prof-
its obtained in the Cournot and Bertrand games. The analysis concludes that
the extended LH preferences produce one of the standard results in oligopolis-
tic theory: quantity-setting competition yields higher profits than price-setting
competition when goods are substitutes and marginal costs are exogenous, as
in Singh and Vives’s (1984) seminal paper.
Finally, we briefly explore some of the outcomes that would be potentially
delivered by integrating the extended LH preferences into a general equilibrium
framework. We consider two alternative product market structures: (i)K and n
large - where firms are aggregate and sectoral price takers; and (ii) K large and
n small - where each firm internalizes the sectoral price eﬀect of its individual
pricing strategy. The model predicts that, in general equilibrium, the Bertrand
markup is lower than the Cournot one. This result is consistent with partial
equilibrium analysis, which provides stronger support for adopting the extended
LH preferences in order to model oligopoly in general equilibrium.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the extended LH prefer-
ences and derives the system of product demand functions (direct and inverse).
Section 3 applies the preferences to a standard partial equilibrium problem -
whether Cournot competition delivers higher profits than Bertrand competition
in the presence of substitutes. Section 4 anticipates and discusses some of the
results the model would produce in general equilibrium. Finally, section 5 closes
with a conclusion and further remarks.
2. The extended LH preferences
The economy consists of K sectors with n (n ≥ 2) firms in each, where
Fik denotes firm i of sector k producing good xik. Following Datta and Dixon
(2000) we define the expenditure function as follows:
E(p, u) = b(p)u, (1)
where p ∈ <nK+ is the price vector of the nK goods and u represents alternative
positive utility levels. The unit cost function b(p) : <nK+ −→ <+ takes the form:
b(p) = µ+ δΨ+ γ[µ− π], (2)
where δ > 0, γ > 0 and the following price indices are defined:
µ =
KP
k=1
nP
i=1
pik
nK ;Ψ =
KP
k=1
ψk
K ;ψk =


2
nP
i=1
nP
j=1
i<j
pik pjk
n(n− 1)


1
2
;π =


KP
k=1
nP
i=1
p2ik
nK


1
2
.
(3)
The unit cost of utility is composed of several aggregate price indices: µ is the
arithmetic average of individual prices, Ψ is the arithmetic average of sectoral-
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specific price indices, where ψk captures the interaction of prices within sector
k or within-sector eﬀects, and π is the variance of prices from zero. The novelty
to Datta and Dixon (2000) is parameter δ in expression (2), where δ captures
the relative importance of within-sector eﬀects. Hence, for δ = 0 we have the
standard LH preferences, a larger δ implies more important within-sector eﬀects.
Notice that for analytical simplicity δ is assumed identical across sectors, and
that b(p) would produce Leontieﬀ preferences when δ = 0 and γ = 0. In the
symmetric solution, where all individual prices are identical: pik = P ∀i, k, the
unit cost function amounts to b(p) = (1+ δ)P since µ = ψ1 = ψ2 = ... = ψK =
Ψ = π = P ; out of the symmetric solution µ < π. Validity of the unit cost
function defined by (2) and (3) is proven in appendix A.
Applying Shephard’s lemma to (2) it follows that:
pikxik
Y =
∂b
∂pik
pik
b ≡ αik, (4)
hence, the share of aggregate nominal expenditure Y going to good xik equals
the elasticity of the unit cost function with respect to pik. Evaluating (4) from
(2) and (3) and re-arranging yields the Marshallian demand function for repre-
sentative good xik as given by:
xik =
Y
bnK

1+ γ +
δ
(n− 1)
nX
j=1
j 6=i
pjk
ψk
− γ pikπ

 , (5)
such that, in an identical fashion, we obtain the Marshallian demand function
for every good produced in the economy. Given K > 0, n ≥ 2, γ > 0 and δ > 0,
it follows that consumer’s demand of xik depends inversely upon its price (pik),
a price index of the sector where the good belongs to (ψk) and a cost-of-living
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index (b, as interpreted from Datta and Dixon (2001)). Correspondingly, it
depends positively upon aggregate nominal expenditure (Y ), an aggregate price
index capturing the distance of prices from a baseline price vector set to zero
(π) and the individual prices of the goods produced by other firms in the sector
(
Pn
j 6=i pjk).
Assuming K and n large, (5) is perceived linear in pik and
Pn
j 6=i pjk by
Fik, that is, each firm takes b, π and its corresponding sectoral index ψ as given
when making optimal production decisions1 . Additionally, given the parametric
assumptions of the model - where γ > 0, δ > 0 and K and n are large posi-
tive numbers - it follows from (5) that goods across sectors are independent,
in the sense that cross-price elasticities are zero, and goods within a sector
are substitutes, in the sense that cross-price elasticities are positive2. Thus,
this theoretical setting characterizes goods within sectors as substitutes. Fur-
ther properties of the product demand function given by (5) are similar to the
ones we find in Datta and Dixon (2000). Specifically, it is straightforward to
1Thus, aggregate price taking follows Dixit and Stiglitz’s (1977) monopolistic competition
model. A novel aspect introduced by the extended LH preferences is the presence of a sectoral-
specific price index in firm’s direct demand. In order to justify that an individual firm, say
Fik, takes the sectoral price index ψk as given, we need to assume that n is not too small. In
the extreme case where n = 2, it is reasonable to think that an individual firm would take into
account the eﬀect of its strategy on the sectoral price index ψk . In other words, xik would not
be linear in pik and
Pn
j 6=i pjk. For simplicity, we address here the case where n is relatively
large, such that an individual firm takes ψk as given. The case of n small is addressed in
Section 4.
2From (5) it follows that φjik = (∂xik/∂pjk)
¡
pjk/xik
¢
= (δ( pjkψk ))/((n − 1)(1 + γ +
δ
(n−1)
Pn
j 6=i
pjk
ψk
− γ pikπ )) > 0.
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check that own-price elasticity and markup vary along the linear product de-
mand schedule, where (the absolute value of) elasticity is increasing in its own
price. Additionally, the product demand function given by (5) is bounded by
the following choke-oﬀ price3 :
pik =
π
γ

1+ γ +
δ
(n− 1)
nX
j=1
j 6=i
pjk
ψk

 , (6)
and the maximum quantity at zero-price:
xik =
Y
bnK

1+ γ +
δ
(n− 1)
nX
j=1
j 6=i
pjk
ψk

 . (7)
A closer analysis of the role of parameters γ and δ in the model follows
from the symmetric solution, where pik = P ∀i, k hence µ = ψ1 = ψ2 = ... =
ψK = Ψ = π = P and b = (1 + δ)P . From (5), it is straightforward to
show that parameters {γ, δ} determine the symmetric own-price elasticity of
direct product demand, specifically |bεik| = (∂xik/∂pik) (pik/xik) = γ/(1 + δ)
and |bεik| > 1 ↔ γ > 1 + δ. Therefore, {γ, δ} parameterize product demand
elasticity, such that γ ∈ (1+ δ,∞) and (1+ δ) sets its lower-bound. Notice that
having γ > δ from the elasticity condition ensures that, in absolute terms, the
own-price eﬀect on product demand is greater than the sum of the cross-price
eﬀects4.
3Let us emphasize that, unlike the Marshallian product demand functions derived in Datta
and Dixon (2000) and in this section, the Constant Elasticity of Substitution/Cobb-Douglas
product demand functions exhibit constant elasticity (and markup) along product demand,
strict convexity and uncut axes.
4Out of the symmetric solution, we assume γ/π > δ/ψk for the own-price eﬀect to dominate
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Intuitively, given γ, we interpret δ as a parameter indicating the intensity of
competition in the economy - recall that in (2) δ is assumed identical across sec-
tors. For δ = 0, we have a very large number (nK) of identical firms operating
in the economy and competing over a share of aggregate nominal expenditure
(αik). This is the monopolistically competitive scenario, where goods are inde-
pendent in the sense that competitors’ individual prices do not explicitly figure
in product demand. For δ > 0, an increase in δ leads the firm to perceive that
a one percent increase in its price reduces its share of aggregate expenditure
by a smaller percentage5. As a result, a higher price strategy is forthcoming.
Therefore, as δ increases the competitive-enhancing eﬀect that competing over
Y brings about is reduced, such that a less competitive outcome follows in
the economy. In summary, the monopolistically competitive economy (δ = 0)
would yield a more competitive outcome than the oligopolistically competitive
one (δ > 0).
Finally, the inverse demand function for the representative good is derived
from (5) as follows:
pik =
ψk π
(γψk − δπ)Z1

(1+ γ)Z1 − bnK δ π
nX
j=1
j 6=i
xjk
Y − bnK Z2
xik
Y

 , (8)
the sum of the cross-price eﬀects. Finally, note that, in symmetric equilibrium, the own-price
elasticity eﬀect of a change in δ, where ∂ |bεik| /∂δ = −γ/(1 + δ)2 < 0, strictly dominates the
sum of the cross-price elasticity eﬀects, where ∂bφjik/∂δ = 1/((n− 1)(1+ δ)2) > 0. Specifically,
|∂ |bεik| /∂δ| > (n− 1)∂bφijk/∂δ ↔ γ > 1, which holds under the assumptions of the model.
5From (2), (3) and (4) it is straightforward to evaluate that: ξik = (∂αik/∂pik)(pik/αik) =
1− ((γ( pikπ ))/(1 + γ +
δ
(n−1)
Pn
j 6=i
pjk
ψk
− γ pikπ )), such that ξik < 0 and ∂ξik/∂δ > 0. At the
symmetric solution, bξik = 1− (γ/(1 + δ)) < 0 and ∂bξik/∂δ = γ/(1 + δ)2 > 0.
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where Z1 ≡ (γψk(n − 1) + δπ) and Z2 ≡ ((γψk − δπ)(n − 1) + δπ) > 0 since
γψk > δπ. Accordingly, we obtain the inverse demand function of every good
produced in the economy.
Next, we derive some partial equilibrium outcomes obtained by modelling
consumer choice following the extended LH preferences. Specifically, we evaluate
whether the derived (direct and inverse) demand functions produce one of the
standard results in oligopoly theory in the context of exogenous labor costs -
namely, that quantity-setting competition yields higher profits than price-setting
competition in the presence of imperfect substitutes.
3. An application to the Cournot-Bertrand profit diﬀerential
There is a continuum of consumer-workers consuming goods from each of
the K sectors the economy is composed of. As a result, an individual firm
cannot significantly influence the income of its consumer-workers, hence firms
take income (Y ) as given. Consider one of the n-size diﬀerentiated sectors.
Firms exhibit constant and identical marginal labor costs (w) according to the
following short-run technology: x = l, where l stands for labor units. Each firm
maximizes nominal profits in the knowledge of the product demand function
it faces, where competitors’ strategies are taken as given. For K and n large,
firms are aggregate and sectoral price takers, that is, they treat as parameters
the aggregate price indices {b, π} and the sectoral-specific price index ψ in
product demand. We consider two types of product market competition: firms
in the oligopoly cooperatively choose to compete in either prices, à la Bertrand,
or quantities, à la Cournot.
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3.1. Price-setting competition
The representative firm Fik maximizes Ω ik = (pik−w)xik in order to choose
pik subject to the demand function given by (5). There are n simultaneous
and symmetric optimizations in sector k. Hence, the unique Bertrand-Nash
equilibrium price is the simultaneous solution to the n-size vector of Bertrand-
Nash best-reply functions in prices as given by:
pB∗ = ψk ((1+ γ)π + γw)
2γψk − δπ
. (9)
Introducing (9) in (5) yields equilibrium quantity under Bertrand competi-
tion as follows:
xB∗ = Y γ ((1+ γ)πψk − (γψk − δπ)w)bnKπ (2γψk − δπ)
. (10)
Finally, from (9) and (10) we obtain the following expression for Bertrand-
Nash equilibrium profits of every firm in sector k:
ΩB∗ = Y γ ((1+ γ)πψk − (γψk − δπ)w)
2
bnKπ (2γψk − δπ)2
. (11)
3.2. Quantity-setting competition
In the quantity-setting game, the representative firm maximizes profits in
order to choose xik subject to the inverse demand function given by (8). Once
again, the unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantity is the simultaneous so-
lution to the n-size vector of Cournot-Nash best-reply functions in quantities.
This is given by:
xC∗ = Y Z1 ((1+ γ)πψk − (γψk − δπ)w)bnKπψk (2γψk(n− 1)− δπ(n− 3))
. (12)
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Substituting (12) into (8) yields equilibrium price under Cournot competi-
tion as follows:
pC∗ = πψk(1+ γ)(γψk(n− 1)− δπ(n− 2)) + Z1(γψk − δπ)w
(γψk − δπ) (2γψk(n− 1)− δπ(n− 3))
. (13)
Equilibrium profits in the Cournot-Nash solution follow from (12) and (13)
as given by:
ΩC∗ = Y Z1(γψk(n− 1)− δπ(n− 2))((1+ γ)πψk − (γψk − δπ)w)
2
bnKπψk(γψk − δπ)(2γψk(n− 1)− δπ(n− 3))2
. (14)
3.3. The Cournot-Bertrand profit diﬀerential
Consider two symmetric sectors of the economy {S1, S2} where competition
takes place à la Cournot and à la Bertrand, respectively. We assume that each
firm in each sector takes as given identical aggregate and sectoral price indices
when making its optimal choice in the product market. Hence, from expressions
(11) and (14), we derive the Cournot-Bertrand profit diﬀerential as follows:
D = ΩC∗1 −ΩB∗2 ≡ (15)
Y δ3π2(2γψ(n− 1)− δπ(n− 2))((1+ γ)πψ − (γψ − δπ)w)2
bnKψ(γψ − δπ)(2γψ − δπ)2(2γψ(n− 1)− δπ(n− 3))2 .
Given the assumptions of the model - where n and K are large positive
numbers, γ > 0, δ > 0 and γψ > δπ - it is straightforward to conclude that the
denominator and the numerator of expression (15) are strictly positive. Hence,
the profit diﬀerential is positive: Cournot profits are above Bertrand profits
when goods are imperfect substitutes. In other words, the partial equilibrium
profits obtained by the representative firm in S1 are greater than the partial
equilibrium profits obtained by the representative firm in S2.
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Under identical aggregate and sectoral price taking, we have shown that
the extended LH preferences produce one of the results established by Singh
and Vives (1984): firm’s preference of Cournot competition over Bertrand when
goods are perceived as substitutes by consumers, in the sense of positive cross-
price elasticities, and marginal costs are exogenous6. For δ = 0, we find that
the profit diﬀerential collapses to zero as profits fall to the monopolistically
competitive solution.
5. General equilibrium: Initial results under alternative product mar-
ket structures
This section investigates some of the outcomes that would be delivered by
embedding the extended LH preferences in general equilibrium. In particular,
we are interested in inspecting the specifications for equilibrium real wage and
markup7. We focus on the symmetric outcome, hence firms anticipate symmet-
ric equilibrium in aggregate (and sectoral, when applicable) price indices. The
following product market structures are considered:
Structure (i): K large and n large
By assuming K and n large, we justify that each firm takes b, π and its
corresponding sectoral index ψ as given when making its sectoral strategic de-
6Notice that if we solve the model anticipating symmetry in aggregate price indices we
obtain simpler partial equilibrium outcomes.
7We do not embed the extended LH preferences in a general equilibrium setting. We simply
investigate some of the results and applications that such general equilibrium framework could
produce.
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cisions. From (5), it follows that the direct product demand function for the
representative good simplifies to:
xik =
y
(1+ δ)nK

1+ γ +
δ
(n− 1)
nX
j=1
j 6=i
pjk
P − γ
pik
P

 , (16)
where symmetry in price indices is anticipated, that is µ = ψ1 = ψ2 = ... =
ψK = Ψ = π = P and b = (1+ δ)P , and y is real aggregate expenditure, that
is y = Y/P . Accordingly, from (8) we re-write the inverse demand function for
good xik as follows:
pik =
P
γ − δ

1+ γ −
nK δ(1+ δ)
γ(n− 1) + δ
nX
j=1
j 6=i
xjk
y −
nK(1+ δ)((γ − δ)(n− 1) + δ)
γ(n− 1) + δ
xik
y

 .
(17)
From the first order condition of profit optimization: pik (1− (1/ |εik|)) = w,
it follows that the equilibrium real wage under price-setting competition in each
oligopoly is given by: ³w
P
´B∗
=
γ − (1+ δ)
γ , (18)
where (w/P )B∗ < 1, and the markup under Bertrand competition takes the
following functional form8: bλBik = 1/ ¯¯¯bεBik ¯¯¯ = (1 + δ)/γ. Correspondingly, the
equilibrium real wage delivered by quantity-setting competition is given by:
³w
P
´C∗
=
(γ − δ)(γ(n− 1) + δ)− (1+ δ)((γ − δ)(n− 1) + δ)
(γ − δ)(γ(n− 1) + δ) , (19)
such that (w/P )C∗ < 1, and the Cournot markup in general equilibrium under
8Recall that
¯¯¯bεBik ¯¯¯ > 1↔ γ > 1 + δ.
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symmetry is given by9: bλCik = 1/ ¯¯¯bεCik ¯¯¯ = ((1 + δ)((γ − δ)(n − 1) + δ))/((γ −
δ)(γ(n− 1) + δ)) .
From (18) and (19), we conclude that quantity-setting competition produces
a lower real wage, hence a higher markup, in general equilibrium10. Notice
that the equilibrium markup under Bertrand competition is invariant to the
number of firms in the oligopoly whereas the equilibrium markup under Cournot
decreases with n 11 . In other words, in the model, as it stands, an increase in n
would simply replicate the Bertrand economy.
Finally, let us point out that from (16), (17) and the optimizing behavior
of firms, we can derive linear labor demand functions that would depend upon
aggregate variables {y, P}. In a general equilibrium framework, this would allow
us to formalize the macroeconomic outcomes of asymmetric right-to-manage
Nash bargaining under alternative degrees of centralization and types of product
market competition12 .
Structure (ii): K large and n small
By assuming n small, we imply that the eﬀect of an individual price on the
corresponding sectoral price index cannot be ignored. The bottom line would
9Note that
¯¯¯bεCik ¯¯¯ > 1 ↔ γ > γC where γC = ((n − 1) + δ(2n − 3) + ((n − 1)2 + δ(2(n −
1) + δ(4n − 3)))1/2)/(2(n − 1)). Hence, γ > γC is the implicit assumption on γ for inverse
demand to be elastic.
10The comparison yields that (w/P )B∗ > (w/P )C∗ ↔ δ2(1 + δ) > 0, which holds ∀δ > 0.
11Specifically, ∂(w/P )C∗/∂n = δ2(1+δ)/((γ−δ)(γ(n−1)+δ)2) > 0 for the assumed range
of parameter values.
12A general equilibrium model of unionized oligopoly embedding the extended LH prefer-
ences can be found in Correa López (2003).
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be a duopoly in each sector or n = 2. As a result, the representative firm
Fik would take into account the eﬀect of its price strategy pik on its sectoral
price index ψk 13 . Accordingly, the assumption of a large number of oligopolies
still implies aggregate price taking, such that the eﬀect of an individual price
on aggregate indices can be ignored. Under this structure, the direct product
demand function for good xik is given by:
xik =
y
nK(1+ δ)

1+ γ +
δ
(n− 1)
nX
j=1
j 6=i
pjk
ψk
− γ pikP

 , (20)
where symmetry in aggregate price indices is anticipated, i.e. µ = Ψ = π = P
and b = (1 + δ)P . The price elasticity of demand at symmetric equilibrium is
now given by:
¯¯¯bεBik ¯¯¯ = (γ/(1+δ))+(δ/(n(1+δ))). From the latter it follows that,
if firm Fik takes into account the eﬀect of its strategy on ψk it will perceive a
more elastic product demand function. Elasticity depends upon n to the extent
that a larger n implies a smaller impact of firm Fik’s price on the sectoral
price index, thus a reduced incentive of the individual firm to follow a low price
strategy.
The presence of a sectoral-specific price index in product demand opens an
interesting possibility for modelling the strategic interactions that may occur
between the monetary authority and price and wage setters14. We might an-
ticipate a new transmission mechanism of monetary policy-making. The basic
13Or, in other words, xik would not be linear in pik and
Pn
j 6=i pjk.
14Furthermore, notice that the model would not produce feedback eﬀects since the assump-
tion of K large implies that economic agents take as given aggregate price indices at partial
equilibrium.
16
message conveyed in this transmission mechanism is straightforward: as long as
firms (and unions) care about the sectoral price eﬀects of their individual pricing
strategies and as long as the central bank monitors sectoral price indices when
designing monetary policy, real eﬀects might be expected from: (i) the specific
institutional environment under which monetary policy is conducted, and (ii)
the monetary policy rule adopted by the monetary authority.
4. Conclusion
The ‘extended linear-homothetic’ preferences developed in this paper pro-
duce (perceived) linear product demand functions that exhibit similar proper-
ties to the ones more frequently used in the analysis of diﬀerentiated oligopolies
(see, for example, Singh and Vives (1984)). A particular advantage of using
the ‘extended linear-homothetic’ preferences to model consumer choice, lies in
its potential application to the study of oligopoly in a tractable general equilib-
rium framework. In addition, an important novelty introduced by the ‘extended
linear-homothetic’ preferences is the presence of a sectoral-specific price index
in firm’s direct demand. For n small, an individual firm would internalize the
sectoral price eﬀects of its product (and labor) market strategies. In a general
equilibrium environment, this could provide us with a link between nonatomistic
price and wage setters and, for example, the monetary authority. Investigating
these issues is left for further work.
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Appendix A. Validity of the expenditure and unit cost functions
The domain of function b(p) is defined by S ≡ {p ∈ <nk+ : pik > 0, i =
1, ..., n, k = 1, ...,K}. We check that b(p) exhibits the suﬃcient properties: (i)
Non-negative and non-decreasing in prices; (ii) Homogeneity of degree one and
concavity in p; (iii) Continuous diﬀerentiability. As Datta and Dixon (2000)
emphasize property (iii) is not necessary for validity but for the application of
Shephard’s lemma. Given our assumptions on parameter values, where n ≥ 2,
δ > 0 and γ > 0, it is straightforward to conclude that b(p) is continuously
diﬀerentiable and homogeneous of degree one.
Concavity in p is proven by checking that b1(p) and b2(p) are concave, where
b1(p) = µ+γ[µ−π] and b2(p) = δΨ. Specifically, concavity of b1(p) implies that
ϕb1(ep) + (1 − ϕ)b1(p) 6 b1(ϕep + (1 − ϕ)p) where 0 < ϕ < 1 and {ep, p} ∈ S.
In order to assess the concavity of b2(p) we start by checking the concavity
of the representative sectoral price index ψk, whose domain sk : sk ⊂ S is
defined by sk ≡ {pk ∈ <n+ : pik > 0, i = 1, ..., n}. Denote Hψk as the Hessian
matrix associated to ψk. Hence, given a n-size sector k, where n ≥ 2, it is
straightforward to check that all principal minors of Hψk exhibit the following
signs:
¯¯¯
Hψkm
¯¯¯
< 0 for m odd and m < n,
¯¯¯
Hψkm
¯¯¯
> 0 for m even and m < n and¯¯¯
Hψkm
¯¯¯
= 0 for m = n (i.e. when
¯¯¯
Hψkm
¯¯¯
=
¯¯
Hψk
¯¯
). More specifically, for m < n,
the leading principal minors can be expressed as follows:
¯¯
Hψkm
¯¯
=
(−1)m
(n− 1)m+1 nm+1 ψm+2k
[−n(m− 1)(n− 1)ψ2k−
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(m− 2)




nX
j=1
j 6=1
pjk


2
+


nX
j=1
j 6=2
pjk


2
+ ...+


nX
j=1
j 6=m
pjk


2
+
2 (
nX
j=1
j 6=1
pjk
nX
j=1
j 6=2
pjk +
nX
j=1
j 6=1
pjk
nX
j=1
j 6=3
pjk + ...+
nX
j=1
j 6=1
pjk
nX
j=1
j 6=m
pjk +
nX
j=1
j 6=2
pjk
nX
j=1
j 6=3
pjk+
nX
j=1
j 6=2
pjk
nX
j=1
j 6=4
pjk + ...+
nX
j=1
j 6=2
pjk
nX
j=1
j 6=m
pjk + ...+
nX
j=1
j 6=(m−1)
pjk
nX
j=1
j 6=m
pjk) ],
which is re-written as:
¯¯
Hψkm
¯¯
=
(−1)m
(n− 1)m+1 nm+1 ψm+2k
(21)

−n(m− 1)(n− 1)ψ
2
k − (m− 2)
mX
i=1


nX
j=1
j 6=i
pjk


2
+ 2
mX
i=1
mX
q=1
i<q


nX
j=1
j 6=i
pjk
nX
j=1
j 6=q
pjk



 ,
such that the long term in brackets in (21) equals zero for m = n. Overall,
we conclude that the Hessian matrix associated to ψk is negative semidefinite,
hence, ψk is concave. Note that the sectoral price indices {ψ1, ψ2, ..., ψK} have
the same functional form as ψk in their corresponding subset of S. Thus, they
are also characterized by negative semidefinite Hessian matrices whose principal
minors exhibit the pattern of signs described above.
Finally, given Ψ = (
PK
k=1 ψk)/K the Hessian matrix associated to Ψ is given
by:
HΨ =


Hψ1 0 0 ... 0
0 Hψ2 0 ... 0
0 0 Hψ3 ... 0
... ... ... ... ...
0 0 0 ... HψK


, (22)
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where the positive constant term (1/K) is omitted for simplicity. The Hessian
matrix HΨ is nK × nK, where 0 stands for a n × n null matrix. From the
structure of (22) and the analysis of Hψk it can be shown that HΨ is negative
semidefinite, more particularly, all its principal minors exhibit the following
signs:
¯¯
HΨm
¯¯
≤ 0 for m odd and m < nk,
¯¯
HΨm
¯¯
≥ 0 for m even and m < nk and¯¯
HΨm
¯¯
= 0 for m = nk (i.e. where
¯¯
HΨm
¯¯
=
¯¯
HΨ
¯¯
). Overall, we can conclude
that Ψ and, hence, b2(p) are concave.
Given the domain defined by S property (i) is re-written such that b(p) has
to be positive and non-decreasing in prices. Property (i) implies that demands
are non-negative; it also implies that an additional unit of utility is costly. As
Datta and Dixon (2000) emphasize if prices are so dispersed that the higher
surpass the choke-oﬀ price, then, some “raw” demands will become negative.
Datta and Dixon (2000) consider two alternatives to formally get around this
possibility. The first one is to set an upper-bound limit on γ, however, this
alternative is not favoured since it would explicitly set an upper limit (that may
be overly restrictive) on product demand elasticity. The second alternative is
to develop what they call the restricted Linear Homothetic cost function B(p).
This function meets all the properties of a valid cost function and, especially,
it meets property (i) since it is designed to “cap” those prices that exceed the
choke-oﬀ price.
After developing the restricted LH cost function, Datta and Dixon (2000,
2001) support the use of the unrestricted b(p) without imposing a restriction
on γ. This is justified by the nature of firms operating in imperfectly competi-
20
tive markets. Profit maximizing firms will not, in general, set prices so high to
make demands negative. In parallel, oligopolistic firms competing in imperfect
substitutes will not find profitable to set a price above the choke-oﬀ price. This
argument allows us to use the unrestricted unit cost function b(p) in (2) com-
fortably. Finally, from the analysis derived above we note that the expenditure
function in (1) is homothetic.
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